Index#
adjustments, 153, 171, 271
Admati, A., 131–41, 161, 210, 212–13, 227
Admati-Pfleiderer models, 144–8, 191, 243–5, 262, 265
adverse selection problem, 67, 193
agents, 89, 180, 206. See also traders
aggregate order flow, 92, 96, 100, 157
aggregate trades, 91, 92, 143, 254
Akerlof, G., 65, 181
Allen, B., 123
Amihud, Y., 23, 29, 51, 188
anonymity, 252–3, 260–8
arbitrage, 11, 234n8, 240, 243, 249–50
Arizona Stock Exchange, 8, 190, 268 ask prices, 15, 20, 45, 147, 186. See also bid prices; bid and ask prices ask prices, 15, 20, 45, 147, 186. See also bid prices; bid and ask prices asset markets, 154, 268
assets, 156, 206–7, 219; and risk, 124, 125, 156, 165, 217; value of, 66, 79, 99, 103, 105, 125, 146, 154, 182, 198
asymmetric information, 54, 57–8, 65, 77, 188, 192, 227, 269; analysis of, 71–2; and bid-ask spread, 66; and market behavior, 73; and monopoly, 182; and volume, 162 auction mechanisms, 15, 49n22, 91-100
automated trading systems, 8, 180-1, 190, 197, 251, 258, 260
average prices, 147–8, 182, 187, 195
Back, K., 100, 102n5, 103–5, 248n11
Bagehot, W., 53, 56, 72, 236
bankruptcy, 16–17, 23, 26, 28, 31
basket securities, 216, 246–7
batch clearing models, 91
batch markets, 255
batch style models, 154ff, 169n7
batch trades, 89, 90, 92, 107, 131, 188, 197, 254
Bayes Rule, 61, 64, 68, 70, 77ff, 77–88, 92, 94, 95, 101, 143, 171, 183–4, 211, 249
beliefs, 64, 77, 82, 98, 99, 200
Bellman equation, 31, 104, 104n7
Bhattacharaya, U., 113n12, 185n3
Biais, B., 49n22, 248n11, 253, 258n3
bid and ask adjustments, 31, 32 bid and ask prices, 23, 28, 29, 31, 33, 38, 41, 81; behavior of, 61, 145; and dealer inventory positions, 51; setting of, 114; and time; 169, 173
bid-ask spread, 54, 65, 73 bid prices, 15, 20. See also ask prices; bid and ask
Black, F., 65, 198, 202, 248n11 block trades, 8, 70–2, 130, 215–16, 223, 233–43. See also large trade
Blume, L.E., 3, 113, 124, 161, 165-7
Bolsa (Mexico City), 12 book. See hole in the book; limit orders, book of; specialists, book of orders, book of; specialists, book of Bourse (Paris), 12, 179
Bradfield, J., 37n16
Bray, M.M., 3
break even prices, 69, 185
Brennan, M.J., 206n19
Brown, D.P., 156–60, 163–6
Brownian motion, 101, 103–5
Burdett, K., 234–9
buy and sell operators, 34
buy and sell orders, 15–17
buy imbalance, 5, 98
buying fees, 48–9 call markets, 10, 38, 103, 143–4, 179, 188–9
Campbell, J., 161
cash failure probability, 20, 22
cash flow, 20n3, 39–40
cash position, 18, 22
CATŠ (Toronto), 180, 194
Chang, E.C., 262
Chowdhry, B., 227–32, 244
Cincinnati Exchange, 190n7, 197
circuit breakers, 11, 65
clumping behavior, 137, 139, 147
Cohen, K., 13, 45–6, 192
commissions, 144–9, 235, 238–9
commitment prices, 235–6, 239
Commodity Exchange Act, 268
compensation, 25, 27, 31, 70
competition, 137, 154, 268
competitive behavior, 58, 60, 64, 67–8, 74, 187, 198, 267; and traders, 47, 48, 106, 108, 110, 144, 183; and trades, 60, 187
competitive markets, 27n5, 44–50, 146, 169, 179, 186–7
conditional expectations, 92, 93, 96, 155, 162–5, 179, 182, 183, 185 conjecture, 163, 224–6
contemporaneous data, 164–5
continuous auctions, 10, 91, 101, 140, 153, 179, 254n2
continuous markets, 103, 188, 208, 253, 255–6
continuous time models, 32, 104–5
continuous trades, 38, 103
convergence, 73, 82, 86, 202n16, 223
Copeland, T., 54–9 passim, 64, 66, 197
Cox process, 30n10
Dann, L.Y., 66
dealers, 15, 28, 31–7, 44, 49, 255; optimizing behavior of, 25; preferred inventory position of, 51; and pricing, 40, 48, 49; problems of, 24, 25–9, 38, 43–4
DeLong, J.B., 205n18
demand functions, 5, 55–6, 114, 162
Demsetz, H., 5–6, 13, 22, 44
derivative instruments, 216, 243, 248
Designated Order Turnaround System, 11
Diamond, D.W., 62n7, 156n2, 169–76passim, 201
differential costs, 226
differential equilibrium, 185
differential information, 119
discounts, 237-8
discrete time models, 104, 105, 140 discrete time multiperiod models, 37, 44
discretionary traders, 132–6, 139, 141, 145–8, 245–6
dividends, 31, 161–2
Diz, 177n11
Domowitz, I., 268
Dow Jones Industrial Average, 11
downstairs markets, 239–40
dual trades, 260, 262–7
dynamic behavior of markets, 24, 37, 241, 270
dynamic programming, 29, 218
Easley, D., 3, 57, 113, 124; and market stability, 192–3, 198, 201–3, 250n12; and speed of adjustment, 201, 203; and stop orders, 198–9; and time, 169–75passim
Easley-O'Hara models, 28n7, 62n7, 65, 66–72, 161, 165–7, 242
economies, 1, 123–4, 163
Edgeworth box, 119, 121
efficiency of markets, 1, 64, 65, 73, 143, 154, 180, 201, 270. See also price(s), efficiency of
electronic markets: See automated trading systems
endowments, 125, 139, 158–9, 164, 182–3, 226; and shock, 218, 223
entropy, 85–6, 171–2, 201
equilibrium, 3, 60, 66–9, 113, 142, 163, 253, 257; imperfect competitive, 116; in Kyle models, 91–4, 101; and linearity, 97–8, 139; nature of, 89; properties of, 47, 93, 113ff, 150–1, 155, 159, 222; and Walrasian auctioneer, 4222; and Walrasian auctioneer, 4 equilibrium prices, 3-5, 92, 166, 206, 208; defined, 14
equity markets, 7, 9, 218
exchange processes, 6–15, 15
existence uncertainty, 71-2
expected profits, 102, 147, 185, 194
expected values, 64, 184, 208, 255
Fama, E., 64n8
finite horizon models, 30, 36–7
Finucane, 177n11 hidden trades, 11, 93, 103, 129–30, 256
Fishman, M., 253, 260, 262, 265–7
Hillion, P., 248n11
floor brokers, 202-3
Hinderer, 29n9
foreign exchanges (FX), 7, 8, 49, 144, 222
Ho, T., 13, 28n8, 29, 31-49passim, 104n7
Forster, M., 253, 260–1
Holden, C.W., 106, 109–12, 113n11
Foster, F.D., 99n4, 106, 109, 130, 140-2
hole in the book, 46, 196. See also specialists, book of
free options, 197–8, 222, 239, 257
French, K.R., 130, 142
Holthausen, R., 66
front runners, 260, 267
Houthakker, H.S., 5
Fudenberg, D., 151
full information values, 67, 73, 82, 90, 96, 100, 154, 173; and equilibrium, 62, 109; and prices, 92, 158
immediacy, 25, 44, 47; cost of, 5–6, 27, 221
inference, 184, 209
futures markets, 64, 90, 173n9, 216, 218
infinity, and trades, 111–12, 145
FX. See foreign exchanges
gains, 67, 146, 182, 185, 251, 255
Galai, D., 54–9 passim, 64, 66, 197 information, 53, 98, 103, 104, 106, 109, 137, 148, 154, 166, 252; life of, 132, 141, 145; and market viability, 181–91; and multiple markets, 243–50; and prices, 101, 107–8, 119, 180, 200; and time, 102, 111, 153ff, 258; and trades, 57, 59, 74, 98; and volume, 160ff
Gallant, A.R., 167
game theoretic approach, 50, 130, 135
Gammill, J.F., 182n257, 59, 74, 98; and volume, 160ff information based models, 53–88, 65, 67–8, 106–7, 162, 181
Garman, M., 13, 14–18, 20–4 passim, 29, 31, 62n6
Gemmill, G., 259n5 information based trading strategies, 89, 185
Gennotte, G., 205–6, 208–9
information events, 66-7
George, T., 253, 260-1
Globex, 8, 180, 268 information monopolist, 90, 92, 113. See also monopolistic dealers
Glosten, L., 57, 138n2, 171n8, 181–7, 190, 254
information uncertainty, 66
Glosten-Milgrom models, 58-66, 70, 143, 169-74 passim, 189-90, 193 informed agents, 61
informed speculators, 114
gravitational pull, 47, 50, 192
Grossman, S.J., 24n4, 125, 154, 156n2, 161, 206, 210, 221; and block trades, 234, 239–40; and liquidity, 217–18
informed traders, 37, 53–7, 58, 62, 65,
Grundy, B.D., 156, 158–60, 163–5, 185n3 mx
informed traders, 37, 53–7, 58, 62, 65, 71, 74, 89ff, 106–12, 134, 141, 145, 155, 174; decision problem of, 68, 145; endogeneity of, 107, 136; and large quantity, 67–9; order strategy of, 96, 98, 105, 138; strategic behavior of, 90–106, 136, 140
Hakansson, N.H., 42
initial positions, 26, 31, 200
Harris, L., 65, 142, 192n9
instantaneous quotes, 35, 55
Harris, M., 161
Instinet, 8, 190
Hasbrouck, J., 24, 28n6, 51, 65, 73n9, 177, 192n9
institutional traders, 8, 180, 186n4, 241-2, 259
Hausman, J.A., 177
insurance trades, 199, 235
hedging strategy, 137–9, 205–6, 208–9, 270–1
interdealer markets, 47, 49
Hellwig, M.F., 156n2, 165
Intermarket Trading System (ITS), 11, 197, 258n4
Hicks, J.R., 3n1
intertemporal behavior, 22, 29, 182n2 inventory, 16, 21–3, 26, 28, 31, 36, 59, 196–7, 217; intertemporal role of, 29–44
inventory models, 13–52, 50–2, 217–18, 240
inventory position, 39, 43
inventory processes, 17, 23
inventory risks, 35, 36
inventory value, 31, 43
Ito's Lemma, 32
ITS. See Intermarket Trading System
Jacklin, C.J., 205, 209
Jackson, M., 113
Jain, P.C., 130
Jennings, R., 156–60, 163–6, 173n9
Joh, G.-H., 130
John, K., 249n11
Jordan, J., 123-4, 163n5, 208n21
jump properties, 45–6, 208
Karpoff, J., 160
Keynes, J.M., 205, 216
Kim, O., 160-2
Kleidon, A.W., 205, 209
Koticha, A., 248n11
Kumar, P., 248–9
Kyle, A.S., 89, 90–116 passim, 224, 227, 230
Kyle models, 77, 90ff, 106–16, 131ff, 131–40passim, 155, 184, 216, 243, 254, 261
large trades, 67–72, 96, 104, 185–7, 186n4, 226, 234ff. See also block trades
Laux, P.A., 52
Leach, J.C., 182n2, 202n16, 250
learning problems, 86, 92, 184 learning process, 64, 77, 91, 161, 165, 180, 237
Lee, C.M.C., 177, 190n7
Leftwich, R., 66
Leland, H., 205-6, 208-9
Leroy, 64n8
limit behavior, 73, 75, 111, 153, 164 limit orders, 10, 37–9, 41, 45–7, 116n13; book of, 196, 198, 200, 252; and informed traders, 91n1; and market stability, 181, 191–7
Lindsay, R., 9, 12n9, 206n20, 260
linear equilibrium, 102, 107, 110, 116, 130, 139, 140
linear order strategy, 34, 95–6, 101, 138
linear pricing rule, 93, 96, 97, 135, 244
liquidation value, 90, 107, 157
liquidity, 13, 45, 108, 141, 154, 170, 213, 223, 257–8, 270; -based orders, 39, 188; defined, 215–16; and market relationships, 215–50; model of, 24n4; nature of, 216–23; and order flow, 15, 105; supply of, 50, 206
liquidity traders, 54, 59, 90, 131, 136, 145, 183, 210
Lo, A.W., 103n6
loans, 242n9
Locke, P.R., 262
London Stock Exchange, 12, 258-9
Longstaff, F., 253, 260, 262, 265–7
losses, 57, 129–30, 182, 185, 186, 251
Lyons, R., 49, 52
MacKinley, A.C., 103n6, 177
Madhavan, A., 24, 51, 52, 182n2, 187–9, 202n16, 250, 253–5
Madoff Securities, 190
Maier, S., 13, 45–6, 192
Manaster, S., 52
Mann, S.C., 52
market behavior, 6, 129, 199; paradigms used to explain, 2–3, 153, 205
market clearing mechanisms, 13, 15, 124, 168, 253
market clearing prices, 3, 4, 7, 21, 94, 114, 133, 153, 185, 253, 269
market crash, 65, 208–9; of 1987, 11, 180, 205, 209, 243
market design, 73, 181, 251, 268–71
market efficiency. See efficiency of markets; price(s), efficiency of
market information, 153–5
market makers, 15, 20–6, 42, 47, 148–50, 155, 181, 203, 217; beliefs of, 100, 172; decision problem of, 58, 68, 184; learning problem of, 61, 66; and pricing, 68, 89, 90, 138, 245. See alsospecialists
market microstructure, 5, 14, 58, 89; definition of, 1-2; literature of, 113, 119, 124, 161, 171; modeling of, 143, 150; research in, 2, 3, 73, 98, 112, 129, 179, 215
market orders, 10, 45, 116n13; defined, 37; flow of, 39
market performance, 181, 205, 251–71; and liquidity, 223–33
market power, 24, 185 market prices, 7, 13–14, 109, 158 markets, 1, 6–12, 180–1; properties of, 114, 168; transparency of, 252–60
market segmentation, 190
market spread, 46–7, 50
market stability, 11, 179ff, 268
market statistics, 89, 168
market structures: and affect on prices, 153; alternative, 65; issues in, 180, 205–14
market viability, 179ff
Markov process, 23, 45, 72
Martingales, 64, 65, 72, 100, 103, 104, 143, 254
noise traders, 91, 93, 108, 112, 114,
Mayers, D., 66
McInish, T.H., 11, 190n7
McNichols, M., 156, 158–60, 163–5, 185n3
Mendelson, H., 15n1, 23, 29, 51, 188
Merton, R.C., 29n9, 32n13
microstructure. See market microstructure
Milgrom, P., 55n2, 57, 59, 67, 159, 171n8, 181, 185n3. See alsoGlosten-Milgrom models
Miller, M.H., 24n4, 217–18, 221, 239
monopolistic dealers, 41, 50, 56, 106, 109, 144, 180, 182, 183, 187, 239, 259, 269
Nanda, V., 227–32, 244
Nash equilibrium, 114, 225
National Market System, 190n8
Mucklow, B., 177
negative price, 65, 96
monopolistic prices, 35, 186
multiperiod models, 36, 48, 102, 217–18, 240
net order flow, 7, 94, 98, 131, 155, 252
multiple markets, 90, 216, 243–50
new information, 66–7, 71, 103, 153, 174
multiple trades, 57, 100, 101–6, 242
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 6, 9–12, 28, 179–80, 182, 187, 190, 197, 232, 258
noise, 140, 182–4, 202, 249
myopic behavior, 157, 166, 199 noisy rational expectations framework, 155–6, 158, 161, 163–4
Oldfield, G., 37, 42, 143, 192
one period models, 35, 48, 50, 54, 114, 130, 132, 166, 182, 193-4, 197, 208n22, 228, 240, 244, 262 nondiscretionary traders, 145–6, 245
normal distributions, 94, 99n4, 123, 182
no trade equilibrium, 59, 67, 175–6, 185n3
Opening Automated Report Service (OARS), 10
one-trade framework, 56
OARS. See Opening Automated Report Service
NYSE. See New York Stock Exchange
optimal bid and ask prices, 27, 56
O'Callaghan, 7n3
optimal inventory position: variability of, 24
O'Hara, M., 37, 42, 57; and block trades, 234–9; and market stability, 192–3, 198, 201–3, 250n12; and stop orders, 198–9; and time, 169–75passim. See also Easley-O'Hara models
optimal order strategy, 90–1, 105, 133
optimal prices, 25, 29, 35–6, 68, 104–5
optimal trades, 93, 103, 110, 193, 235, 257, 266
optimization, 13, 14, 31, 104n7
option pricing models, 56n3, 105n8, 248n11
options, 197, 216
order arrival processes, 14–18, 24, 35, 114, 266
order arrival rates, 16, 22
order driven markets, 253–4
order flow, 13–16, 38, 91–4, 132, 192, 203, 253; behavior of, 37, 104–5; and information, 206, 252, 260; and information-based trades, 55, 188, 190, 202; lessons of, 58, 180; monitoring of, 104, 255
order processing costs, 25 orders, 8, 39, 90, 105, 132, 191; market at close, 191
order strategies, 92, 101, 106, 114, 198, 246
outside customers, 217, 219–20, 238 overnight market, 38, 40, 42
Pagano, M., 223–8, 232, 247, 253, 255–7, 260, 262, 267
patterns, 142, 143ff, 155
Pfleiderer, P., 131–40, 205, 209, 210, 212–13, 227. See also Admati-Pfleiderer models
Poisson processes, 16, 17, 30, 36, 45
policy issues, 98, 251
pooled informed traders, 59, 68, 74
pooling equilibrium, 68–70, 135, 189–91, 242, 257
portfolio insurance, 202, 206
portfolio returns, 29
portfolio risks, 25, 35
portfolio trades, 26–8, 30, 185, 217, 241
POSIT, 8, 190
positive profits, 92, 106, 265
posterior beliefs, 95, 98, 101, 126
posterior means, 95, 100
posterior probability, 77, 81
potential competition, 44n18
preferred inventory positions, 24, 51-2 price adjustments, 75, 77, 82-3, 93,
price adjustments, 75, 77, 82–3, 93, 109, 111, 154, 271; paths of, 65, 74, 203. See also price process
price behavior, 191–204; and call markets, 143–4; and informed traders, 106–12; and risk aversion, 222; and variance, 98
price consumption curves, 119, 120, 122, 123
price contingent orders, 39, 114,
191–2, 202–3. See also limit orders price discovery, 250, 254, 259, 269–70 price elastic demand functions, 55
price formation, 1, 196; traditional view of, 2ff; two traditional approaches to, 3; and Walrasian auctioneer, 4, 114
price process, 46, 153–77
price(s), 1, 3–6, 10, 58, 90, 106, 147, 169, 176, 182, 196; efficiency of, 64, 82, 103, 108, 110, 153, 158; and information, 2, 107–8, 112, 119, 153ff; and order flow, 22, 109, 133; revelation of, 136, 154, 163; sequence of, 154, 155, 157, 204; setting of, 4, 6, 13, 24–9, 31–2, 58, 205; and size of trade, 70, 101; stability of, 11, 204; and time horizons, 153ff; and volume, 160–77
pricing policies: changes in, 43
pricing problem: complexities of, 44
pricing rules, 92, 97, 104, 125, 185-6
private information, 67, 89, 90, 92, 93, 107, 109, 145, 156, 180, 268; and traders, 129, 132, 136
private investments, 161-2
private signals, 157, 198, 206
probabilistic trades, 45, 55, 59, 62, 67, 74, 170
probability structure of trade, 63 proceeds constraints, 169, 173
profits, 15, 21, 42, 69, 145–6; and information, 107, 194;
maximization of, 22, 24, 89, 107 public information, 47, 107, 132, 140, 142, 161
queues, 58, 74, 175
quotes, 187, 253-4
Raab, R.J., 66
Radner, R., 3, 3n1, 4n2, 123, 208n21 random variables, 36, 43, 77, 86, 98, 109–10, 185; normal distribution of, 86–8, 93, 114, 125, 156–7, 218; random distribution of, 183
rate of return, 27, 53 rational expectations equilibrium, 113ff, 123–4, 154, 208
rational expectations models, 3, 59, 89, 98, 113, 119–27, 155ff, 179, 182, 185n3, 188, 206, 210, 230, 254. See also Kyle models
Raviv, A., 161
Ready, M.J., 177
recursive models, 31, 101–2
risk, 28, 35, 162
risk averse traders, 42, 182
risk aversion, 25–7, 28, 108–9, 114–15, 138, 182, 221;
risk free assets. See assets, and risk risk neutral dealer model, 54–6
risk neutral intertemporal models, 29
SOFFEX. See Swiss Options and Futures Exchange
risk neutrality, 60n4, 108, 134, 138 risk neutral market makers, 70, 90, 131, 182–3, 198
Sofianos, G., 24, 51
risk neutral spread, 35, 42 risk neutral traders, 54, 58, 67, 90, 109, 235
specialists, 9–11, 25, 38, 44, 60, 70, 153, 180, 182; book of, 9–10, 37, 38, 179, 192–4, 198, 200. See also market makers
risky assets. See assets, and risk
Roberts, H., 64n8
speculation, 59, 227
Rochet, J.C., 91n1, 113-14, 116n13
Rock, K., 192–4, 196–8, 214 speculators, 107, 210, 217, 219, 221–2. See also outside customers; informed traders
Roell, A., 253, 255–7, 260, 262–5, 267
Spiegel, M., 113n12, 130, 138–9, 185n3
Roll, R., 65, 130, 142
Rossi, P.E., 167
Rothschild, N.M., 7
Rule 80A, 11
spread, 21, 24, 28, 36, 42, 43, 49, 54, 56, 64, 181, 202; and large trades, 68–9; and liquidity, 216–17; structure of, 42; and time horizons, 35n15
Srinivas, P.S., 248n11, 250n12
saitori, 8, 11–12
Starks, L., 173n9
Schaede, U., 9, 12n9
Stickel, S.E., 160
Schleifer, A., 205n18
Stiglitz, J.E., 125, 154, 156n2
Scholes, M., 248n11
Schwartz, E.S., 206n19
Schwartz, R., 13, 45–6, 192 stochastic processes, 29–30, 32, 171, 200–1, 203; and order flow, 16, 29–30, 36
search models, 235, 240
stocks, 30–1, 35–7, 43 securities markets, 13, 73, 119, 130, 169, 180, 190, 201, 205, 250; batch trading in, 89; and information, 232, 247
Stokey, N., 55n2, 59, 67, 159, 185n3
Stoll, H., 13, 25, 29, 30–49 passim, 104n7, 188n5, 197, 222
security market microstructure: theoretical analyses of, 13ff stop orders, 192–3, 198–200, 203
security prices, 1, 13, 24–5, 66, 119, 147, 154, 179, 251
strategic behavior, 67, 74, 90, 92–3, 106, 140–2; and security returns, 143–50; and trading mechanism, 113–17
security returns, 142–50, 247
semi-strong-form efficiency, 64 strategic models, 89ff, 129ff, 150-1, 179. See also Kyle models
separating equilibrium, 68–70, 135, 257
Seppi, D., 130, 234, 240–3, 248–9
strong-form efficiency, 64, 82
sequential-auction models, 91, 101–3, 110
Strong Law of Large Numbers, 83–5, 88, 100, 165–6
sequential trade models, 58–9, 60, 66, 67, 73–5, 129, 161, 169, 173, 198
Subrahmanyam, A., 106, 108–12, 113n11, 130, 134, 138–9, 243–5067, 73–5, 129, 161, 169, 173, 198 shocks, 183, 208, 217, 223
Summers, L.H., 205n18
short sales, 169–70, 173, 236
sunshine trades, 210–14, 260, 265
signals, 66–7, 96, 119–21, 124, 134, 157–8, 163, 165, 201; and noise, 140, 156, 182, 249; quality of, 167–8; and uninformed traders, superior information, 54, 65, 90, 227, 262
supply and demand, 4–5, 14, 60, 157, 163131, 170. See also information single auction framework, 91-100 supply curves, 5, 35, 213
supply uncertainty, 156, 158
small trades, 71–2, 186, 226, 231n5
Smidt, S., 23, 24, 51, 52
Swiss Options and Futures Exchange (SOFFEX), 180
Smith, 103n6
social welfare, 182, 251, 257
syndication, 70, 234–9
Smith, T., 262
Tauchen, G., 167
Taylor series expansion, 26, 33, 34 terms of trade, 41, 106, 109. See also market prices
third markets, 190, 269
three-period models, 156, 217
time dimensions, 14, 17, 30, 62, 64, 130, 168–77, 179, 217
time horizon, 31, 35, 153ff
Tirole, J., 151
TMCE. See two market conjectural equilibrium
Tokyo Stock Exchange, 11–12, 258n4
trade delays, 258–9
trade returns, 143–50
traders, 5, 47, 58, 162, 169, 223, 253; behavior of, 4, 6, 13, 101–2; information sets of, 155–8, 167; optimal order strategy of, 46, 98, 101, 114; population of, 58, 67; types of, 67, 206, 210, 217. See also discretionary traders; informed traders; noise traders; risk neutral traders; uninformed traders
trade(s), 1–5, 9, 62, 67, 91, 137, 140, 168, 170, 261–2; gains and losses and, 252ff; information content of, 57–8, 74, 129, 168; patterns of, 130, 135, 142; as signals, 57, 168130, 135, 142; as signals, 57, 168 trade sizes, 28, 66, 91, 96, 182, 214, 223
trading days, 37–8, 40, 101, 131, 139, 147, 175, 199
trading game, 8, 113. See also trading mechanisms
trading halts, 65, 67, 181, 185
trading mechanisms, 8, 94, 106, 180, 222; categories of, 8; design of, 1, 181, 205; and equilibrium, 3, 113; goal of, 11; governing rules of, 6–7; and market viability, 180, 186–7; nature of, 89
trading periods, 90, 131, 134
trading process, 5, 103, 113, 129
trading volume, 160–8, 176
trading week, 140–1 transaction costs, 5, 46, 47, 53, 227, 262
transaction size, 27, 35, 183
transparent markets, 255–6
tree diagram, 62, 63
true value, 26, 27, 30, 61, 65, 77, 158–9, 198
truth, 26, 75, 155–6, 177, 240
two date models, 25, 193–4
two market conjectural equilibrium, 224–5
two period models, 156, 158, 206, 210, 223
uncertain information, 14, 71, 202
uninformed traders, 53–7, 62, 71, 74, 96–7n3, 114, 129ff, 134, 154, 174–5, 186–7; behavior of, 101–2, 199; and large quantity, 67–8; order distribution of, 92; problems of, 59, 170
uninformed volume, 96–7n3
units of trade, 186, 195 upstairs markets, 70, 215, 223–34, 239–40
utility, 38, 125, 219
utility maximization problems, 157
utility of wealth, 182, 183
value functions, 40, 238
variables, 23, 33, 184
variances, 98, 99n4, 100, 102, 188n5, 203–4, 226
variance terms, 33
Verrecchia, R.E., 62n7, 156n2, 160-2, 201; and time, 169-76passim
Vila, J.L., 91n1, 113–14, 116n13
Viswanathan, S., 99n4, 106, 109, 130, 140–2
volatility, 103, 271
volume of trade, 6, 130, 160–8
Waldman, R.J., 205n18
Wald's Lemma, 171
Walrasian auctioneer, 4, 114, 120, 124
Wang, J., 161–2
weak-form efficiency, 64 wealth, 36, 182–3; base, 31; initial, 19, 26; terminal, 25–6, 29, 31, 125, 218
weekend effect, 140, 142
Weiner process, 46
welfare, 185, 186, 190, 269
Weunch, S., 190
Whaley, R.E., 188n5, 262
Whitcomb, D., 13, 45–6, 192, 222n3
Wiener process, 30
Wilson, C.A., 189
Wood, R.A., 11, 190n7
Working, H., 5
worse prices, 96, 101, 109, 185, 186, 189, 199, 234, 242
Zabel, E., 37n16
zero profit, 56, 60, 92, 187